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ABSTRACT
Contemporaries, and economic historians, have noted several features of medieval and early modern
European monetary systems that are hard to analyze using models of centralized exchange. For
example, contemporaries complained of recurrent shortages of small change and argued that an
abundance/dearth of money had real eﬀects on exchange. To confront these facts, we build a
random matching monetary model with two indivisible coins with diﬀerent intrinsic values. The
model shows that small change shortages can exist in the sense that adding small coins to an
economy with only large coins is welfare improving. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by increases in trading
opportunities. Further, changes in the quantity of monetary metals aﬀect the real economy and
the amount of exchange as well as the optimal denomination size. Finally, the model shows that
replacing full-bodied small coins with tokens is not necessarily welfare improving.
∗The ﬁgures in this paper are best viewed in color.
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Randy Wright, and participants at seminars at the Bank of Canada, the Canadian Economics Association,
the World Cliometrics Conference, and the University of Toronto for helpful comments. The views expressed
in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Modern monetary economies rely on ﬁat money, largely a 20th century innovation.
Prior to that time, commodity monies, in a variety of guises, were used to facilitate exchange.
This paper takes the view that there is an important distinction between ﬁat money and
commodity money that has not been given suﬃcient attention. Speciﬁcally, with commodity
money there is a necessary link between the physical characteristics (e.g., weight and size) of
a unit of money and its value. However, with ﬁat money — because it is intrinsically useless
and inconvertible, — there is no such link.
This link between physical characteristics and value created real challenges for mon-
etary authorities operating under a commodity money regime. For one, coins could not be
too small or light, because the smaller or lighter the coin, the more likely it was to be phys-
ically lost or lost through wear and tear. In addition, coins could not be too large or heavy,
because the heavier or larger the coin, the more inconvenient it was to transport or exchange.
Further, restrictions on minting technology meant that coins had to be produced in distinct
sizes; that is, coins had to be indivisible. That monetary authorities operating under com-
modity money standards were not always able to meet these denominational challenges is
shown by the recurring complaints about shortages of small change that disproportionately
hurt the poor.
In this paper, we build a model of a commodity money system that explicitly takes
account of these constraints on the monetary authority. We show that introducing and
modeling these constraints helps in understanding commodity money systems in general and
the monetary policies of medieval Europe and the complaints of contemporaries about that
system in particular. Thus, we agree with Mayhew (2004) who states that “any study of the
money supply [in medieval Europe] needs to take account not only of the total face value of
the currency, but also of the metals and denominations of which it is composed”(p. 82).
Speciﬁcally, we set up an economy in which there is an absence of double coincidence
of wants and decentralized exchange among anonymous agents. In this economy, a medium
of exchange is essential in the sense that it allows the economy to achieve allocations that
could not be achieved without it. The role of media of exchange is ﬁlled by indivisible coins
of diﬀerent sizes and metals. The indivisibility of coins means that the existence of multiple
coins of diﬀerent sizes (diﬀerent “denominations”) can improve allocations in the sense of
delivering higher ex ante welfare than can be achieved with only a single size coin.
Several previous studies have built explicit models of commodity money systems with
multiple types of coins. Sargent and Wallace (1983) build an overlapping generations model
with two storable goods, gold and silver, which can be transformed into and out of a perish-
able good at a some cost. They determine the conditions under which there are monetary
equilibria (equilibria in which at least one storable good has value). Sargent and Velde
(2002) build a model with a large coin, which they call a “dollar,” and a small coin, which
they call a “penny.” Denomination issues are introduced by assuming that one of the two
goods in their model can only be purchased with pennies. In other words, their model has a
“penny-in-advance” constraint in addition to the usual budget constraint. Velde and Weber
(2000) build a model with gold and silver coins in which agents get direct utility from the
uncoined stocks of these metals that they hold.
These models are subject to several criticisms about their abilities to analyze the
problems with commodity money systems. The Sargent and Velde (2002) and Velde andWeber (2000) models are subject to the standard criticism of all cash-in-advance models:
that the market incompleteness that gives rise to the need for a medium of exchange is simply
assumed. It does not arise from fundamentals such as preferences or technologies. And all
three models are subject to the criticism that even though coins exist in these models, they
are perfectly divisible. Therefore, these models seem inadequate to address denomination
issues, which are essentially issues of indivisibility. Finally, they are stand-in agent models,
so that distributional eﬀects of diﬀerent coin denominational structures cannot be analyzed
in them.
Other studies of commodity money systems do not use the cash-in-advance framework
but rather use a decentralized bilateral matching framework similar to that in this paper.
These are the papers by Velde, Weber, and Wright (1999) and Bignon and Dutu (2007).
However, these papers cannot fully analyze the issues with commodity money systems be-
cause they impose a unit upper bound on money holdings and only permit exchanges of
coins for goods. They do not permit exchanges of coins for goods plus coins. Thus, the
denomination structure of the coinage, in the sense of the value of coins that can be oﬀered
for purchases, is extremely restricted.
In our model, we expand the denomination structure of the coinage in several ways.
First, our model has two diﬀerent coins with diﬀerent intrinsic values. In this way, we capture
the historical reality that for most of the last millennium there were bimetallic monetary
systems in the West. We generate a demand for large value coins by introducing a cost to
carrying coins that is monotonically increasing (we assume linear) in the number of coins
that an agent carries.
Second, the model permits exchanges of coins for goods plus coins; that is, change-
giving is permitted in our model. This gives our model another attractive feature. In it, the
quantity of small coins aﬀects both buyers and sellers. That is, in our model, the terms of
trade between buyers and sellers, and in some cases the ability to trade, depends upon the
coin portfolios of both, not just the portfolio of buyers as was the case in, for example, the
Sargent and Velde (2002) analysis. This dependence of trade on the portfolios of both buyers
and sellers arises from the indivisibility of coins, which we regard as a major contributor to
the problems with commodity money systems.
Finally, building on the work of Lee, Wallace, and Zhu (2005), we allow agents to
hold multiple numbers of each of the two coins. The result is that in the equilibria of our
model, there is a distribution of poor agents who hold few coins and rich agents who hold
many coins or coins with the higher intrinsic value. This heterogeneity is important in the
analysis for reasons we discuss below.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss some stylized facts about
commodity money regimes that we want our model to confront. We draw heavily upon the
experience of England for these facts. In section 3, we present our model. In section 4, we
present the implications of the model and relate them to the stylized facts. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
2. Commodity Money Systems
In medieval and early modern Europe, the money stock was comprised of coins of
silver and (from the 14th century) gold. Two features of the monetary system of this period
that have attracted the attention of economic historians are the impact of changes in the
2quantity of money in aggregate and the quantity of small denomination coins. In each case
there are discussions of both scarcity and abundance of coins and the impact of the quantities
of coins on output and welfare.
A. The quantity of money
Writ very large, the records speak of an abundance of silver in the 13th century and
a dearth of silver and gold in the mid-15th century. The mint output data in Figure 1
support this. Metcalf (1977) speaks of England being“awash” in bullion from 1180 to 1300.
Mayhew (2004) estimates that while annual per capita real income in England was essentially



























Figure 1: Mint output in medieval/early modern England
In contrast to the descriptions of plentiful money stocks in the 13th century, the 15th
century, and especially the 1440s and 1450s, are portrayed as a period of scant money. The
existing silver mines in Europe had been played out, and no new mines opened until the
1460s. Spuﬀord (1989) notes that many European mints closed for 20 years in the middle of
the 14th century, and concludes that the “silver-famine of the late 14th and 15th centuries
1By the 13th century, coins were used throughout England not only for large transactions such as taxes,
rents, and wages, but also for small purchases, such as beer and bread. Metcalf (1977), for example, comments
that “throughout the thirteenth century the use of coinage was in fact pervasive, not just in towns and ports
and among the merchant class, but in villages throughout the land”(p. 13). Similarly, Mayhew (1999) notes
that “money had already become a central consideration in the lives of even the poorest by the beginning
of the thirteenth century” (p. 16).
3appears more severe than anything that had taken place since the seventh century.”(p.
340) Figure 1 shows the low level of English mint output from 1380 to 1460, excluding the
recoinages of 1412 - 14 and 1421. Notice too that the mint coined about 100 tonnes of silver
in the recoinage of 1278 - 80, but only 2 tonnes of silver and gold coin equivalent in value to
70 tonnes of silver during the recoinage of 1412-14.2 Challis (1992) emphasizes that this low
English mint output must be seen in the context of “the great bullion famine which aﬄicted
North West Europe in general at this time.”(p. 190)
If we take as exogenous the broad changes in the quantity of monetary metals, the
interesting question is, what would have been the consequences? The quantity theory answer
is clear: an exogenous change in the quantity of money will, perhaps after a transitory short-
term impact on output, raise prices and leave output unchanged. Yet, historians have seen a
diﬀerent outcome. Mayhew (1999)’s picture of the 13th century is the clearest: “Put simply,
buying and selling became easier when there was more coin about”(p. 13). Put alternatively,
an increase in the money stock led to an increase in output and welfare as well as prices.
Our model generates such a result.
B. The scarcity of small change
From the time of Charlemagne to approximately 1200, the silver penny was the only
coin minted in Western Europe, although the silver content of the penny varied across
countries and even cities. Sargent and Velde (2002) note the contrast between Venice, where
the penny contained .05 g of silver, and England, where it contained 1.3 g of silver (p. 45).
The English penny was both small in size (a US dime weighs about 2.3 g) and large for retail
payments. Bread cost a farthing (a quarter pence) a loaf, with the size of the loaf being set
by the Assizes in each city depending on the price of corn. Daily wages for a labourer were
about 1d. per day. Not surprisingly, historians such as Britnell (2004) considered the penny
“an inconveniently large unit for retail trade”(p. 24).
The need for lower denomination coins led to the introduction of halfpennies and
farthings beginning in 1279. Britnell (2004) concludes that by 1300, “the monetary system
could suit the needs of small households better than a hundred years before”(p. 24).3
Yet, permission to strike small denomination coins did not necessarily imply that they
were produced. Data on mint output by denomination are available only for the period 1280
- 1351 (see Figure 2), but these show the generally low level of small denomination coin
production. Regulations varied slightly over time, but broadly speaking, the mint workers
had no incentive to produce halfpennies and farthings, which required double or quadruple
the eﬀort.
The primary mechanism for obtaining small denomination coins appears to have been
complaining of the injury done by the lack of small change suﬃciently aggressively that a
quota was imposed on the mint workers. For example, Ruding (1840) describes a petition
2Sussman (1998) has pointed out the weakness of the case of those who argue that the bullion famine
and the accompanying price decline reﬂected a drain of specie to the East. He argues that in the early 15th
century, the cause of low mint output was lack of demand; however, he is agnostic about the low mint output
of the mid-15th century.
3The groat — containing four times as much silver as the penny — was also created under the mint
indenture of 1279, but does not seem to have been minted until the mid-14th century when gold coins were
also introduced. The smallest gold coin was worth approximately 80 pence.
4from the late 1370s stating that
certain weights for bread, and measures for beer, such as gallon, pottle, and
quart, were ordained by statute, and that they the said Commons had no small
money to pay for the smaller measures, which was greatly injurious to them. (p.
237)
























Figure 2: London mint: Silver coin output (thousands of pounds)
One of the common complaints encountered in the literature is that of a scarcity of
small change that aﬀected both buyers and sellers. These complaints were almost always
accompanied by the claim that such shortages disproportionately hurt the poor — for ex-
ample, this excerpt from a petition to the king asking for issues of halfpence and farthings
in February 1444 - 45:
Men traveling over countries, for part of their expenses of necessity must depart
our sovereign lord’s coin, that is to wit, a penny in two pieces, or else forego all
the same penny, for the payment of a half penny; and also the poor common
retailers of victuals, and of other needful things, for default of such coin of half
pennies and farthings, oftentimes may not sell their said victuals and things,
and many of our said sovereign lord’s poor liege people, which would buy such
victuals and other small things necessary, may not buy them, for default of half
pennies and farthings not had on the part of the buyer nor on the part of the
seller; which scarcity of half pennies and farthings, has fallen, and daily yet does,
5because that for their great weight, and the ﬁneness of allay, they be daily tried
and molten, and put into other use, unto the increase of winning of them that
do so. (from Ruding (1840) p. 275)
This petition was granted, and the king ordered the mint to coin halfpennies and
farthings at 33 shillings per pound rather than 30 shillings per pound for two years. The
increased revenue was shared between seignorage, the mint workers, and the bullion sellers,
and the legal tender of the coins was restricted to small transactions. (Mayhew (1992),p.
110; Craig (1953),p. 87).
In 1560, after the Great Debasement, Queen Elizabeth “restored” the silver coinage
to its traditional sterling ﬁneness, but she did not restore the weight to its 1540 level. The
penny now weighed 0.5 g, and the mint, concluding that halfpennies and farthings would
be too small to handle, instead produced coins valued at 3
2d. and 3
4d. which would permit
payments of a farthing (Craig (1953),p. 123). The scarcity of small denomination coins
continued to cause complaints. In 1599 the mint workers were given 1d. (ﬁnanced by a
reduction in seignorage) to produce 1.5% of silver output in silver denomination coins. This
eﬀort seems to have been too little to quell complaints and too little to pay for the costs; in
the 1660s the money was withheld from the mint for lack of performance, and the mint was
required to produce £125 in change “for the more convenient change of our people” (Craig
(1953), p. 159).
The challenge of minting small denomination coins continued until the mint autho-
rized private copper coins in the late 18th century (see Sargent and Velde (2002) and Redish
(2000)).
C. Token coins
By “token coins”, we mean coins either that are silver but contain less metal than
the penny or that are made of a base metal such as copper or lead. Such coins seemed to
come into frequent use during the medieval period. The literature is full of references of
the attempts of the English sovereigns to prevent the importation and circulation of foreign
token or billon coins. However, some private English tokens were permitted to be used at
least once. As Ruding (1840) states, “At an early period of his [Henry VIII’s] reign, or about
the conclusion of his father’s, private tokens were used to supply the want of silver coins”
(p. 301). We would like our model to deliver the implication that in an economy without
an intrinsically valuable small denomination money, the existence of tokens — that is, coins
with no intrinsic value — can lead to higher welfare.
We will also use our model to examine a claim of Elizabeth I. In justifying an edict
to reduce the values of base monies, she proclaimed:
First of all it is known that the honour and reputation of the singular wealth
that this realm was wont to have above all other realms, was partly in that it
had no current monies but gold and silver, whereas contrary all other countries
...have had, and still have, certain base monies now of late days, by turning of
ﬁne monies into base, much decayed and daily grown into infamy and reproach,
and therefore is thought necessary to be recovered. (from Ruding (1840) p. 334)
To examine whether Elizabeth’s claim is correct, we will use our model to determine the
welfare eﬀects of replacing a given supply of token money with the same quantity, in terms
6of numbers of coins, of intrinsically valuable small denomination money. In other words,
we will examine the eﬀects of replacing a given supply of token coins with the equivalent
number of intrinsically valuable small denomination coins.
3. The Model
A. Environment
The model has discrete time and an inﬁnite number of periods. There are two non-
storable and perfectly divisible goods: a special consumption good and a general consumption
good.
In addition, there are two metals (durable commodities) — silver and gold — in the
economy. There are ms ounces of silver and mg ounces of gold in existence. Each ounce of
these metals gives oﬀ one unit of the general consumption good at the beginning of each
period.4 These metals are divisible, but not inﬁnitely so. We will refer to the objects into
which these metals are divided as coins. Thus, there can be many silver and many gold
coins in the economy, but not inﬁnitely many. In other words, coins are indivisible monies,
and the supply of each type of coin must be ﬁnite. The assumption that metals generate
dividends is our way of modeling commodity money.
The monetary authority in this environment chooses how many ounces of a metal to
put into a coin of that metal. We let bs be the ounces of silver that it puts in a silver coin
and bg be the number of ounces of gold that it puts in a gold coin. Thus, a silver coin yields a
dividend of bs units of the general consumption good per coin to the holder at the beginning
of a period, and a gold coin yields a dividend of bg units of the general consumption good
per coin to the holder at the beginning of a period. The total supplies of the two types of
coins are Ms = ms/bs and Mg = mg/bg, respectively.
As was the case with coins throughout most of the time during which commodity
monies were used, these gold and silver coins do not have denominations. They are simply
amounts of the two metals that have been turned into coins with some type of standardized
markings that allow one type of coin to be easily diﬀerentiated from a diﬀerent type of coin.
To capture the fact that historically silver coins were less valuable than gold coins, we assume
that for technological reasons bs < bg, silver coins must be less valuable than gold coins in
the sense of yielding a lower dividend per coin.5
Letting s and g be an agent’s holdings of silver and gold coins, respectively, an agent’s
portfolio of coin holdings is
y = {(s,g) : s ∈ N,g ∈ N}.
Let Y = N
N
N be the set of all possible portfolios.
There is a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents in the model. Let q denote the
quantity of special good. We assume the agent’s preferences are
u(q) − q + sbs + gbg − γ(s + g)
4Instead of viewing silver and gold as metals, they could be viewed as two diﬀerent kinds of Lucas trees.
5It is not critical to the analysis that the coins be of diﬀerent metals. Both coins could be gold or both
could be silver. What is important is that the two coins have diﬀerent intrinsic values (diﬀerent bj).
7with u(0) = 0, u0 > 0, u00 < 0, and u0(0) = ∞. The disutility of special good production is
assumed to be linear without loss of generality. The term sbs + gbg is the utility the agent
gets from general goods received by holding coins, and γ is the utility cost, also in terms of
general goods, that the agent suﬀers for each coin held coming into a period.6
At the beginning of each period, an agent has a probability 1
2 of being a consumer
but not a producer and the same probability of being a producer but not a consumer. This
assumption rules out double coincidence matches, and therefore gives rise to the essentiality
of a medium of exchange.
After agents’ types (consumer or producer) are revealed, a fraction θ ∈ (0,1] of agents
are matched bilaterally. In a match, the coin portfolio of both agents is known. However,
past trading histories are private information and agents are anonymous. These assumptions
rule out gift-giving equilibria and the use of credit. Thus, trading can only occur through
the use of media of exchange, which is the role that the gold and silver coins can play.
B. Consumer choices
We assume that in a single coincidence pairwise meeting, the potential consumer gets
to make a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) oﬀer to the potential seller. This oﬀer will be the triple
(q,ps,pg), where q ∈ <+ is the quantity of production demanded, ps ∈ Z is the quantity of
silver coins oﬀered, and pg ∈ Z is the quantity of gold coins oﬀered. Oﬀers with ps < 0 or
pg < 0 can be thought of as the seller being asked to make change.
Let w(y) : N
N
N → <+ be the expected value of an agent’s beginning of period
portfolio of coin holdings. The set of feasible TIOLI oﬀers is a combination of special good
output and coins that is a feasible coin oﬀer and satisﬁes the condition that the seller be no
worse oﬀ than not trading. Denoting this set by Γ(y, ˜ y,w),
Γ(y, ˜ y) = {σ : q ∈ <+,−˜ s ≤ ps ≤ s,−˜ g ≤ pg ≤ g,
−q + βw(˜ s + ps, ˜ g + pg) ≥ βw(˜ y)},
where ˜ y denotes the seller’s portfolio. The arguments of σ are (q,ps,pg).
C. Equilibrium
We will consider only steady state equilibria in this section. The three components
needed are the value functions (Bellman equations), the asset transition equations, and the
market clearing conditions. We proceed to describe each in turn.
Value functions
The steady state value functions are
6At this point we could have combined bs, bg, and γ into two net terms. However, it will be convenient
later to have separate terms for beneﬁts and costs. In addition, we could have assumed that coins have













+gbg + sbs − γ(s + g),
where π(˜ y) is the fraction of agents holding ˜ y. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is
the expected payoﬀ from being a buyer in a single coincidence meeting, which occurs with
probability θ
2. The second term is the expected payoﬀ either from being the seller in a single
coincidence meeting or from not being in a meeting. The ﬁnal terms are the net utility from
holding silver and gold coins.
Asset holdings
Deﬁne λ(k,k0;y, ˜ y) to be the probability that a buyer with portfolio y in a meeting
with a seller with portfolio ˜ y leaves the meeting with k silver coins and k0 gold coins. That
is,
λ(k,k




1 if k = s − ps(y, ˜ y) and k0 = g − pg(y, ˜ y)
0 otherwise.









0;·) + λ(s + ˜ s − k,g + ˜ g − k
0;·)]
)
+ (1 − θ)πt(k,k
0).
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the fraction of single coincidence meetings in
which the buyer leaves with k silver coins and k0 gold coins. The second term is the fraction
of such meetings in which the seller leaves with k silver coins and k0 gold coins. The ﬁnal
term is the probability that no meeting occurs, in which case no coins change hands.
Of course, asset holdings must also satisfy
P
y π(y) = 1.
Market clearing
The market clearing conditions are that the stocks of gold and silver coins must be






Deﬁnition 1. Steady state equilibrium: A steady state equilibrium is a (w,π,Γ) that
satisﬁes the value functions, the asset transition equations,
P
y π(y) = 1, and market clear-
ing.
94. Results
We are unable to prove the existence of steady state equilibria or to obtain analytic
results for our model. Therefore, we rely instead on computed equilibria for numerical
examples to obtain our results. Speciﬁcally, we assume u(q) =
√
(q),β = 0.9,θ = 2
3,mg =
0.05, and ms = 0.03. For most of our examples we will assume a gold coin size of bg = 0.05,
which implies a per capita supply of gold coins Mg = 1. Because we are interested in small
change, we will consider various values for bs. Note that because we assume the quantity
of silver is ﬁxed, changing the size of the silver coin also changes the number of coins in
existence. Further, even though the theoretical model assumes no upper bound on coin
holdings, we impose upper bounds S = 40 on silver coin holdings and G = 2 on gold coin
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Figure 3: Distribution of coin holdings
The distribution of portfolios in a sample steady state where bs = .01 and γ = .001
is shown in Figure 3. Approximately 4% of the agents hold zero coins of either type, while
the most widely held portfolio is three silver coins and one gold coin, which is held by 9.5%
of the agents. The ex ante welfare ¯ w is 1.50, which represents a loss relative to the welfare a
planner would achieve, which is 1.63.8 Only a small part of this loss (
γ
1−β(Mg +Ms) = 0.04)
arises from the costs of carrying coins. By far the largest part is due to the fact that the
output produced in the individual matches diﬀers from the eﬃcient quantity, q∗. Although
7For several cases we also computed equilibria assuming S = 30 and G = 3. These equilibria did not
diﬀer much from the equilibria reported in the text.
8We assume that the planner would have the eﬃcient quantity q∗ produced in every meeting and that no
10we ﬁnd that the amount produced is too small in most cases, there are matches in which a
quantity greater than q∗ is produced.
A. Small change shortages
Deﬁnition 2. Small change shortage: A small change shortage occurs in an economy
when adding small (silver) coins to an economy with only large (gold) coins is welfare im-
proving.
Here we show that small change shortages could occur. We also examine whether there
is an optimal (in terms of ex ante welfare) ratio between the sizes of the coins and whether
changes in the trading opportunities available to agents in an economy (think: development
of organized markets) aﬀect the optimal size of silver coins. Further, we examine how the
poor are aﬀected by the introduction of small coins, and how their welfare changes as the
size of small coins changes.
Our model’s results concerning whether the introduction of small coins improves wel-
fare and whether there is an optimal ratio between large and small coins are given in Figure
4. There we plot as a function of the size of a silver coin the ex ante welfare of the agents in
an economy with both gold and silver coins over that if only gold coins (or only pennies in
the case of England) were in existence.9
The ﬁgure shows that small change shortages can occur under a commodity money
system. The addition of silver coins to gold coins (or halfpennies or farthings to pennies in
the case of England) improves ex ante welfare.10 Both lines in the ﬁgure lie above zero for
at least some sizes of small coins.
Figure 4 also shows that if silver coins exist in the economy, decreasing the size of the
silver coin can improve welfare. Intuitively, this occurs because the smaller the silver coin,
the more precisely the buyer can adjust the TIOLI oﬀer made to the seller. However, the
ﬁgure also shows that this is only the case when the silver coins are not too small. After
some point, ex ante welfare falls as the size of the silver coin is decreased. (The dotted lines
mark the silver coin size that yields maximum ex ante welfare for each of the γ’s.) Further,
the fact that the lines intersect the x-axis for bs > 0 shows that after some point silver coins
can become too small. This occurs when there are so many of them in existence that the cost
of holding them exceeds their intrinsic value plus their value in trade. In such a case, agents
would prefer to throw them away rather than hold them. Not surprisingly, the minimum
size for a small coin such that agents are willing to hold it increases as the cost of holding
coins increases, as shown by the fact that the dashed line intersects the x-axis to the right
of the solid one.11







[u(q∗) − q∗] + ms + mg}.
9For the gold coins only case, we assume that agents still get per capita dividends of ms, so that the
change in welfare is due strictly to the addition of silver coins, not to the addition of silver per se.
10We also checked whether there could be “large denomination shortages” in the sense that adding gold
coins to an economy with only silver coins would improve welfare and found that it did.
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n gamma = 0.001
gamma = 0.01
Figure 4: Welfare from the addition of small coins of various sizes for diﬀerent γ
Because ex ante welfare is not always decreasing in coin size, there is an optimal size
ratio between the two coins. The ﬁgure shows that this ratio decreases as the cost of holding
a coin increases.
Figure 5 shows the fraction of single coincidence matches by the type of payment
made in the match.12 The ﬁgure shows that the largest fraction of matches are ones in
which trade is done solely with silver coins. This fraction is approximately 3
4 of all matches
except when silver coins became large, when it drops to about 3
5. The next largest fraction
of matches are ones in which silver coins are given as change for gold coins. This is almost 1
4
of all matches when silver coins are small, and this fraction also falls as silver coins are made
larger. The ﬁgure also shows that matches in which trade is done solely with gold coins are
infrequent and only happen when silver coins are large. There are no matches in which both
gold and silver coins are oﬀered in trade. There is an increasing fraction of matches in which
even though trades are possible, no trade takes place (the dark area at the top of the ﬁgure).
Finally, there is an increasing fraction of matches (the white area at the top of the ﬁgure)
in which trade cannot take place because potential buyers have no coins.
In the model, θ is the probability of a match, so changing θ can be interpreted as
to have silver coins in addition to gold coins even if the cost of holding a silver coin is greater than its intrinsic
value. This is due to the fact that silver coins are useful in trade. However, this is not true when γ = 0.001.
There the intrinsic value of the silver coin must be greater than the cost of holding it in order for the addition
of silver coins to be welfare improving.
12To compute these fractions we calculated
P
y,˜ y π(y)π(˜ y)I(y, ˜ y) where I(y, ˜ y) is an indicator function that
takes on the value of 1 if trade of a particular type occurs in a match between an agent holding y and an
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Figure 5: Fractions of matches by type of trade and size of silver coin, γ = 0.001
changing the trading opportunities available to agents in the economy. We now examine how
changes in trading opportunities available to agents in an economy aﬀect the optimal size of
silver coins. To do so, we compute ex ante welfare for θ = {1
5, 1
3, 2
3} for various sizes of silver
coins, holding the size of the gold coin ﬁxed. Throughout we assume that γ = 0.001.
The results are shown in Figure 6. When θ = 1
5, that is, when an agent has a
one-in-ﬁve chance of having a single coincidence match in any period, the ex ante welfare
maximizing size of the silver coin is bs = 0.015, which, given that we have assumed a gold
coin size of bg = 0.05, gives an optimal ratio of 31
3 : 1.13 When θ = 1
3, the ﬁgure shows that
the optimal size of the silver coin falls to bs = 0.011, or an optimal ratio of approximately
41
2 : 1. And when θ = 2
3, the case studied above, the optimal coin size is bs = 0.0092, for
an optimal coinage ratio of approximately 51
2 : 1. Thus, our model indicates that decreasing
the size of silver coins would be an optimal response to an increase in a country’s trading
opportunities.
Intuitively, the smaller the silver coin, the more ﬁnely a potential buyer is able to
calibrate an oﬀer of wealth (in the form of coins) for goods to a potential seller. The ﬁner
the wealth oﬀer that a buyer can make, the less likely it is that the buyer will have to take
a smaller quantity of goods from the seller in exchange for a given wealth transfer or have
to give up additional wealth to get the desired quantity.
Obviously, buyers would like to have silver coins be inﬁnitely small. However, the
beneﬁts of making ﬁner oﬀers have to be traded oﬀ against the costs of carrying more coins.
When a buyer has a high probability (the θ = 2
3 case) of being in potential trade matches,
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Figure 6: Ex ante welfare as a function of silver coin size for various θ, γ = 0.001
the beneﬁts of ﬁner oﬀers is high and small silver coins are preferred. But these beneﬁts fall
as trade occurs less often, so larger silver coins are preferred because of the lower carrying
costs.
Lastly, in this section we examine the claim that the shortage of small denomination
coins falls hardest on the poor. We do this in two ways. First, we look at how the welfare
of an agent with a given wealth in terms of silver coins changes as the size of the silver coin
changes. That is, we calculate how w(y|ˆ w), where ˆ w = sbs is some value of the agent’s silver
coin wealth, varies as the size of the silver coin varies. Because we are concerned with poor
agents, we consider only agents who hold no gold coins, which is why gold coin holdings do
not appear in ˆ w.14 Second, since the pattern of trade aﬀects the distribution of agents’ coin
holdings, we examine how this distribution changes as the size of the silver coin varies.
The eﬀects of changes in small silver coin size on the welfare of agents with small
amounts of silver coin wealth are shown in Table 1. The entries in the left column of the
table are the metallic content of an agent’s silver coin holdings. The entries in the second
column are an agent’s welfare for a silver coin size of bs = 0.01, which from Figure 4 is close
to optimal size of the silver coin. The entries in the third column are for a larger silver
coin size bs = 0.015. The entries in the fourth column are for an even larger silver coin size
bs = 0.02. Note that the implied coin holdings for a given metallic content of silver coin
holdings diﬀer by column. For example, for a metallic content of ˆ w = sbs = 0.06, an agent is
holding 6 coins when bs = 0.01, 4 coins when the metallic content is bs = 0.015, and 3 coins
14Consistent with Mayhew (2004)’s comment cited in the introduction, we ﬁnd that for similar values of
total coin wealth, sbs + gbg, w(y) is diﬀerent for diﬀerent y.
14Silver coin Welfare
wealth (ˆ w = sbs) bs = 0.01 bs = 0.015 bs = 0.02











Table 1: Welfare by metallic content of agents’ wealth holdings for various coin sizes
when the metallic content is bs = 0.02. This is why there are gaps in the table.
Table 1 shows that small change shortages have a greater eﬀect on the poor. The
welfare of agents with small amounts of silver coin wealth (≤ 0.05) increases as the silver
coin becomes smaller. After that level of wealth, however, this is no longer always the case,
and as an agent’s silver coin wealth becomes large enough, the agent would prefer to have
larger size silver coins.
Next, we examine how changing the size of the silver coin aﬀects the distribution of
wealth. This is shown in Figure 7, which plots the cumulative distribution of agents by their
wealth in terms of silver coins (recall that g = 0). The ﬁgure shows that the fraction of agents
with little such wealth falls sharply as the size of the silver coin is decreased. Speciﬁcally,
when bs = 0.02, approximately 14% of agents have no wealth at all and approximately 25 %
have wealth in terms of silver coins of 0.02 or less. When bs = 0.015, the percentages fall to
roughly 10 and 22, respectively. And when the size of the small coin falls to bs = 0.01, the
percentages are approximately 4 and 12, respectively. Note that the fraction of agents with
larger amounts of wealth in silver coins is approximately the same over the three coin sizes
and is invariant to coin size. This further shows that variations in the size of small coins
have the largest eﬀects on the poor.
B. Quantity of money
Deﬁnition 3. Monetary neutrality: Let ¯ w(m) be ex ante welfare in an economy with
metal stocks m = (ms,mg), and let ˜ w(m) be that value net of the present discounted value of
the dividends from metal stocks, that is, ˜ w(m) = ¯ w(m) − 1
(1−β)(ms + mg). Metal stocks (the
quantity of money) are neutral if, ceteris paribus, ˜ w(m) = ˜ w(µm) for all µ.
Consider two economies, one with µ times more of both metals than the other. The
quantity of money is neutral if ex ante welfare in the economy with more money equals that





























Figure 7: Fractions of agents with g = 0 and various levels of silver coin wealth for various
sizes of silver coins, γ = 0.001
dividends from the diﬀerent money stocks.
To determine whether or not commodity money is neutral we consider three economies
m = (0.015,0.025),m0 = (0.02,0.033), and m00 = (0.03,0.05). That is, we compare economies
with µ = 4
3 and µ = 2 to the original. In Figure 8 we plot ˜ w(m) for various sizes of silver
coins for each of these economies. If money were neutral, the lines would lie on top of each
other. Obviously they do not. Our model implies that commodity money is not neutral.
Varying the stock of monetary metal could aﬀect ex ante welfare through three chan-
nels:
1. There is the direct positive wealth eﬀect from having more monetary metals generating
more dividends (
µ−1
(1−β)(ms+mg), which is incorporated into the deﬁnition of neutrality.




3. There may be an eﬀect on the distribution of coin holdings and the quantity of output
transacted in matches. We will refer to this as the transactions eﬀect.
It is the possibility of these last two eﬀects that can lead to monetary nonneutrality.
As an example, consider the economies m and m00. Table 2 shows that the direct
welfare gain from the increased dividends arising from the increased money stock is 0.4. We
compute the total welfare gain (given bs = .005) to be larger, 0.424. The diﬀerence arises
because even though there is a loss due to the costs of carrying the additional coins, it is more
than oﬀset by the transactions eﬀect. The proportion of agents that do not trade (because
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Figure 8: Ex ante welfare as a function of silver coin size for various levels of metallic wealth,
γ = 0.001
Table 2: Welfare impact of increasing monetary stocks
Equilibrium
µ = 1 µ = 2 µ = 2
bs = .005 bs = .0092
ms,mg .015,.025 0.03,.05 0.03,.05
Silver coin size bs .005 .005 .0092
Number of coins Ms,Mg 3, 0.5 6, 1 3.25, 1
Total welfare (¯ w) 1.072 1.496 1.518
Welfare from metal 1
(1−β)(ms + mg) 0.4 0.8 0.8
Welfare net of metal value (˜ w) 0.672 0.696 0.718
Welfare loss from carrying 1
(1−β)γ(Ms + Mg) (.035) (.07) (.0425)
Welfare from transactions 0.707 0.766 0.760
Percentage of agents that do not trade 7.4 1.5 4.4
17to 1.5% capturing Mayhew (1999)s description of the impact of more monetary metal in the
13th century: “buying and selling became easier when there was more coin about.”
Of course, there is no reason why the size of coins must remain unchanged when
the stock of monetary metals changes. In fact, it may be optimal for the size of coins to
be changed in response to save on carrying costs or to facilitate more transactions. Figure
8 shows that it is in fact optimal to increase the size of silver coins in economies with
proportionally more quantities of the two metals. Speciﬁcally, in the economy with m, the
optimal size of the silver coin is bs = 0.005. However, in the economy with m00, the optimal
size of the silver coin is bs = 0.0092. Table 2 shows that the increase in coin size causes a
reduction in the welfare from transactions, but this is more than oﬀset by the decrease in
the loss from carrying coins.
C. Token coins
In this section, we examine whether ex ante welfare is higher with token coins or with
full-bodied coins as claimed in the earlier quote from Elizabeth I. For this, we compute ex
ante welfare for various quantities of tokens and silver coins, where we deﬁne a token to be
a coin with no intrinsic value. To eliminate any wealth eﬀects, we assume the same ms in
both and that it is distributed lump sum to all the agents in the economy with tokens. That
is, in terms of the value function, we assume that bs = 0 and add ms. Further, we assume
that silver coins and tokens have the same carrying cost. Our justiﬁcation is that such coins







































Figure 9: Ex ante welfare for various quantities of silver coins and tokens, γ = 0.001
The results are shown in Figure 9. We ﬁnd that ex ante welfare is higher with token
coins than with full-bodied silver coins when the quantity of silver coins or tokens is small.
18However, the opposite is true when the quantity of silver coins or tokens is large.
Because we have eliminated wealth eﬀects and carrying cost eﬀects by assumption, the
diﬀerences in ex ante welfare must be due to transactions eﬀects — eﬀects on the quantity
of output transacted in matches and the distribution of coin holdings. Deﬁne the average




˜ y q(y, ˜ y), where q(y, ˜ y) is the quantity traded in
y, ˜ y matches. We ﬁnd that for any Ms, ¯ q is always higher for full-bodied silver coins than
tokens. A buyer with silver coins is able to extract more output from the seller because a
more intrinsically valuable object is being oﬀered. We also ﬁnd that ¯ q is decreasing as Ms
increases. For silver coins this is explained by the fact that there is less metal in the coin as
Ms increases. For token coins, the relative scarcity of tokens when Ms is small makes them
more valuable. Further we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between ¯ q for silver coins and ¯ q for tokens
is decreasing as Ms increases.
These results might seem to suggest that welfare should always be higher with silver
coins than with tokens, because utility is increasing in q. However, that neglects the fact that
because the cost of production is linear in q, sellers are worse oﬀ as q increases. The surplus
in a trade, u(q)−q is maximized at q∗, and is decreasing in q when q > q∗ and increasing in
q when q < q∗. At low levels of Ms, ¯ q in both the silver and token economies exceeds q∗, so
that the higher average output per trade in the economy with silver coins generates a lower
ex ante welfare. Conversely at high levels of Ms, where ¯ q in both the silver coin and token
economies is lower than q∗, the higher average output per trade in the economy with silver
coins generates a higher ex ante welfare.
5. Conclusion
Contemporaries, and economic historians, have noted several features of medieval
and early modern European monetary systems that are hard to analyze using models of cen-
tralized exchange. For example, contemporaries complained of recurrent shortages of small
change that aﬀected the ability of both buyers and sellers to trade. These shortages were seen
as disproportionately hurting the poor. It has also been argued that an abundance/dearth
of money had real eﬀects on exchange.
To confront these facts, we build a random matching monetary model with two in-
divisible coins with diﬀerent intrinsic values. The model shows that small change shortages
can exist in the sense that adding small coins to an economy with only large coins is welfare
improving, This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by increases in trading opportunities. Further, changes
in the quantity of monetary metals aﬀect the real economy and the amount of exchange as
well as the optimal denomination size. Finally, the model shows that replacing full-bodied
small coins with tokens is not necessarily welfare improving.
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